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INTRODUCTION
The impact of the Supreme Court’s decision in Merck KGAA v.
Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd.1 on the safe harbor provision of the
Hatch–Waxman Act2 is the focus of the following discussion.
Thus, this paper analyzes the recent decision and proposes a new
standard for determining whether Federal Drug Administration
(“FDA”)–related conduct is exempt from infringement under the
safe harbor. However, a thorough understanding of the section, its
origins, and earlier judicial interpretations is beneficial in assessing
the present scope of this important provision.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT
The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act
of 19843—also known as the Hatch–Waxman Act (the “Act”)—
profoundly affected both the patent and food and drug laws and
consequently, the manner in which the U.S. pharmaceutical
industry operates.4 It attempted to strike a balance among
competing interests (particularly, innovator and generic
pharmaceutical companies).5
The Act amended the food and drug laws by, inter alia,
creating a new procedure for approving generic drugs, which now
includes antibiotics (but not biologics)—the Abbreviated New

1

125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005), vacating, 331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000).
3
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98–
417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 68b–68c, 70b (1984); 21 U.S.C. §§ 301 et al.
(1984); 35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271, 282 (1984)).
4
See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 665 (1990).
5
See Allergan Inc. v. Alcon Labs., Inc., 324 F.3d 1322, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(explaining the benefits of the Act to both brand name and generic drug manufacturers).
2
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Drug Application (“ANDA”).6 It also altered the patent laws in
various ways. For example, the erosion of a patent’s term during
FDA review is offset by extending the term for a period based on
the length of agency review.7 In addition, the Act created a cause
of action for patent infringement linked to the new ANDA
procedure.8 It is considered a “theoretical” act of infringement to
file an ANDA seeking FDA approval to market a patented drug
before the pertinent patent expires.9 Only equitable remedies,10
whose determination was expressly assigned to the court, are
available to redress such theoretical infringement.11
The Act also established an exemption to infringement.12 A
patentee’s competitors can usually begin marketing an otherwise
infringing product only when the patent expires, or shortly
thereafter.13 The marketing of pharmaceuticals, however, is
strictly regulated by the FDA, and FDA approval can, and usually
does, take years.14 Moreover, under the Federal Circuit’s decision
in Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co.,15 a potential
competitor could not even commence the testing required to seek
FDA approval without infringing pertinent patents prior to their
6

See id.
35 U.S.C. § 156(a)(4) (2000). See Pfizer Inc. v. Dr. Reddy’s Labs., Ltd., 359 F.3d
1361, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
8
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A) (2000).
9
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A). See Allergan Inc. v. Alcon Labs., Inc., 324 F.3d at 1326.
This section also covers so-called “paper NDAs” or “§ 505(b)(2) applications.”
10
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(4) (2000). Monetary damages are only awarded if the infringer
commercially manufactured, used, offered to sell, or sold an approved drug or veterinary
biological product within the United States or imported such products into the United
States. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(4)(C) (2000).
11
See Glaxo Group Ltd. v. Apotex, Inc., No. 00 C 5791, 2001 WL 1246628, at *4
(N.D. Ill. Oct. 16, 2001); Pfizer Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., No. 00 C 1475, 2001 WL
477163, at *3 (N.D. Ill. May 3, 2001). See generally Brian D. Coggio & Sandra A.
Bresnick, The Right to a Jury Trial Under the Waxman–Hatch Act, 52 FOOD & DRUG L.J.
259 (1997); Brian D. Coggio & Timothy E. DeMasi, The Right to a Jury Trial Under The
Waxman–Hatch Act: The Question Revisted and Resolved, 57 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 155
(2002).
12
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000).
13
See Brian D. Coggio & F. Dominick Cerrito, The Safe Harbor Provision of the
Hatch–Waxman Act: Present Scope, New Possibilities, and International Considerations,
57 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 161, 162 (2002) [hereinafter Coggio & Cerrito, Safe Harbor].
14
See generally 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–97 (2000).
15
733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
7
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expiration.16 Thus, because of this prohibition, the lengthy
approval process was further prolonged, and the availability of
drugs was delayed.17 This ruling was not limited to generic filings,
but also impacted any pharmaceutical research, including studies
to prepare an NDA.18 During the FDA-approval process, however,
the patentee would still enjoy market exclusivity, even though the
relevant patent(s) had expired.19 Congress addressed this situation
by creating the safe harbor provision, section 271(e)(1), one
provision of the Hatch–Waxman Act.20 Changes to the Act
implemented by the FDA regulations effective August 2003, and
the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization
Act of 2003,21 did not affect the scope of the safe harbor
exemption.22
II. THE SAFE HARBOR PROVISION
Section 271(e)(1) of Title 35, United States Code, reads:
It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to
sell, or sell within the United States or import into the
United States a patented invention . . . solely for uses
reasonably related to the development and submission of
information under a Federal law which regulates the
manufacture, use or sale of drugs or veterinary biological
products.
The section was intended to overrule the Roche decision and to
exempt from infringement the bioequivalency testing needed to
secure FDA approval of generic drugs.23 Indeed, at one time, it
16

See id. at 863.
See Coggio & Cerrito, Safe Harbor, supra note 13, at 162.
18
See id.
19
See id.
20
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000). See generally Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496
U.S. 661 (1990); Coggio & Cerrito, Safe Harbor, supra note 13.
21
Pub. L. No. 108–173, 117 Stat. 2206 (2003).
22
See generally Brian D. Coggio, M. Veronica Mullally, & Todd L. Krause, Congress,
FDA Address Hatch–Waxman Issues: Recent Agency Regulations and 2003 Medicare Act
Clarify and Modify Generic Drug Law, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 26, 2004, s2 (col. 1).
23
See generally Allan M. Fox & Allan R. Bennett, The Legislative History of the Drug
Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (FDLI 1987).
17
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had been argued that the section was limited to bioequivalency
testing.24 This interpretation was rejected, and over the ensuing
years, the section has been construed very broadly.25 This trend
was abruptly halted by the Federal Circuit’s decision in Integra
Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGAA,26 although the Supreme
Court’s opinion vacating that decision gave the scope of the
exemption a “wide berth.”27
A. Early Decisions Interpreting the Safe Harbor
Early decisions addressing the safe harbor focused on the word
“solely” and whether the alleged infringing “uses” related “solely”
to the FDA approval process.28 These decisions, particularly
Scripps Clinic, limited the scope of the exemption,29 while
subsequent decisions focused on the phrase “reasonably related”
and greatly expanded its scope.30 In fact, conduct that is
“reasonably related” to securing FDA approval does not forfeit
immunity even if that conduct has additional purposes.31 For
24
See Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 666 F. Supp. 1379, 1396
(N.D. Cal. 1987) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 98–857 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2647).
25
See, e.g., Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 1269, 1276–77 (Fed. Cir.
1993); see also Abtox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 888 F. Supp. 6, 8–9, (Fed. Cir. 1997);
NeoRX Corp. v. Immunomedics, Inc., 877 F. Supp. 202, 205–06 (D.N.J. 1994); Elan
Transdermal Ltd. v. Cygnus Therapeutic Sys., 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1926, 1931–33
(N.D. Cal. 1992).
26
331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
27
Merck KGAA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2372, 2380 (2005).
28
See, e.g., Scripps Clinic, 666 F. Supp. at 1395–96 (holding that use of patented
compound to obtain data for FDA approval and to support European patent filing was
infringement); see also American Standard Inc. v. Pfizer Inc., 722 F. Supp. 86, 102–03
(D. Del. 1989). The Federal Circuit in Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGAA, 331
F.3d 860, 866 (Fed. Cir. 2003) rediscovered the term “solely.”
29
Scripps Clinic, 666 F. Supp. at 1395–96. But see Elan Transdermal Ltd. v. Cygnus
Therapeutic Sys., 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1926, 1932–33 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (finding that
“solely” is correctly read as modifying “uses,” not “reasonably related”). The Elan court
specifically held that the Scripps Clinic decision “misconstrues the exemption.” Id. at
1932.
30
See, e.g., Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 1269, 1280 (N.D. Cal.
1991) (“Thus, Congress used this phrase to communicate its intention that the courts give
parties some latitude in making judgments about the nature and extent of the otherwise
infringing activities they would engage in as they sought to develop information to satisfy
the FDA.”).
31
See id. at 1287–88.
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example, in Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., the district court
stated that “the inquiry is not generally whether the allegedly
infringing party has engaged in conduct that shows that it has
purposes beyond generating and presenting data to the FDA.”32
Thus, the term “solely” is not determinative.33
B. Standard for Applying the Safe Harbor
Application of section 271(e)(1) requires a two-step analysis:
(1) only infringing uses are analyzed under the section; and (2)
only those infringing uses that are not “reasonably related to the
development and submission of information” to the FDA are
actionable.34
The district court in Intermedics framed the
following test:
Would it have been reasonable, objectively, for a party in
defendant’s situation to believe that there was a decent
prospect that the “use” in question would contribute
(relatively directly) to the generation of kinds of
information that [are] likely to be relevant in the processes
by which the FDA would decide whether to approve the
product?35
In applying the exemption, the nature of the alleged infringing
conduct, not the subjective intent of the purported infringer (e.g., a
profit motive), is determinative.36 In Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc.
v. Ventritex, Inc.,37 the Federal Circuit held that activities designed
32

Intermedics, 775 F. Supp. at 1278.
In affirming, the Federal Circuit held that “[r]eliance on section 271(e)(1) is not
precluded by manifestation of an intent to commercialize upon FDA approval.”
Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1524, 1528.
34
See Abtox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 888 F. Supp. 6, 8–9 (D. Mass. 1995); NeoRX Corp.
v. Immunomedics, Inc., 877 F. Supp. 202, 205–06 (D.N.J. 1994) (manufacturing product
in U.S. for non–U.S. testing to generate data for foreign regulatory agencies is not
protected).
35
Intermedics, 775 F. Supp. at 1280.
36
See id. at 1280–81 (holding that only a defendant’s actual acts, as opposed to alleged
future acts, were relevant and cautioned against considering underlying motives, indirect
effects, and long range consequential benefits).
37
982 F.2d 1520 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding that data, originally gathered for FDA
submission, did not lose their protection because they were used to obtain financial
backing).
33
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to raise funds were within the safe harbor, and stated: “It would
strain credulity to imagine that Congress was indifferent to the
economics of developing and marketing drugs and medical devices
when it enacted § 271(e)(1).”38 Again, the term “solely” was not
determinative.39
The Intermedics standard was used by various courts and
expressly approved by the Supreme Court in Merck KGAA v.
Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd.40 It is submitted, however, that a new,
more precise test can be formulated based on the Court’s recent
decision. This proposal is discussed in section IV, infra.
C. Attempts to Limit the Safe Harbor
Even before the Federal Circuit’s decision in Integra, some
courts had limited the scope of the safe harbor. For example, in
Baxter Diagnostics Inc. v. AVL Scientific Corp.,41 the district court
found that Class I and II—as opposed to Class III—medical
devices were not subject to section 271(e)(1) because the safe
harbor and patent term restoration provisions (35 U.S.C. § 156)
were linked.42 Since only patents covering Class III medical
devices could be extended, only those patents (not patents covering
Class I or II devices) were covered by the safe harbor.43 On

38

Id. at 1525.
See Chartex Int’l PLC v. M.D. Personal Prods. Corp., 1993 WL 306169, at *2–3
(Fed. Cir. 1993).
40
125 S. Ct. 2372, 2383 (2005).
41
798 F. Supp. 612 (C.D. Cal. 1992) (holding that Class I and II devices were not
subject to exemption).
42
Id. at 620. See generally James M. Flaherty, Jr., PMA Primary: Synthesizing the 35
U.S.C. § 156 Patent Term Extension, 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) Patent Infringement
Exemption as Currently Applied to Medical Devices, and Medical Device Preemption
Jurisprudence to Yield a Cohesive Solution Regarding Scope of Coverage, 56 FOOD &
DRUG L.J. 339 (2001) [hereinafter Flaherty, PMA Primary].
43
Baxter Diagnostics, 798 F. Supp. at 618–20. In rendering its opinion, the court
relied on Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 672–73 (1990), which
involved Class III medical devices. Id.
39
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reconsideration, the court reversed its decision.44 Subsequent
decisions also rejected this view of “class” distinction.45
In NeoRX Corp. v. Immunomedics, Inc.,46 the court denied
summary judgment of non-infringement where the defendant had
manufactured the patented product in the United States and
shipped it overseas for testing to support foreign regulatory
approval.47 Apparently, the court found that the accused conduct
lacked any link to an FDA filing and was therefore not exempt.48
Subsequently, the court in Biogen, Inc. v. Schering AG,49 relying
on NeoRX, stated: “Biogen’s shipment of Avonex samples [the
patented product] produced in the United States to foreign
regulatory authorities was not related to FDA requirements or
other federal law and, therefore, was outside the statutory
exemption.”50 The Biogen court also held that stockpiling of a
drug in anticipation of FDA approval was “far more than merely
do[ing] clinical trials for submission to the FDA” and thus was
outside the safe harbor.51
In Infigen, Inc. v. Advanced Cell Technology, Inc.,52 Infigen
alleged infringement of a patent covering a process for activating
bovine oocytes for use in cloning cattle.53 The court rejected the
safe harbor exemption, adopted the rationale of the initial Baxter
Diagnostics decision, and limited the type of patents embraced by
section 271(e)(1):

44

See Baxter Diagnostics, Inc. v. AVL Scientific Corp., 954 F. Supp. 199 (C.D. Cal.
1996); see also Nexell Therapeutics, Inc. v. Amcell Corp., 143 F. Supp. 2d 407 (D. Del.
2001).
45
See, e.g., Abtox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 888 F. Supp. 6, 8–9 (D. Mass. 1995), aff’d,
122 F.3d 1019 (Fed. Cir. 1997), amended by 131 F.3d 1009 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Chartex
Int’l PLC v. M.D. Personal Prods. Corp., 1993 WL 30619, at *2 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
46
877 F. Supp. 202 (D.N.J. 1994).
47
Id. at 207–09.
48
See id. at 209.
49
954 F. Supp. 391 (D. Mass. 1996).
50
Id. at 397 n.1.
51
Id. at 396–97.
52
65 F. Supp. 2d 967 (W.D. Wis. 1999); see also PharmaStem Therapeutics, Inc. v.
Viacell Inc., No. Civ.A. 02–148 GMS, 2003 WL 548496 (D. Del. Feb. 26, 2003)
(“umbilical cord blood stem cells units are not regulated by the FDCA and therefore
cannot be considered a drug” within purview of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1)).
53
See Infigen, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 969.
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Thus, holders of certain patents received an extended
period of protection under the patent [§ 156]; in exchange,
they were barred from collecting damages caused by
otherwise infringing acts and by persons engaging in such
acts solely for uses reasonably related to complying with
FDA requirements. See Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 671, 110 S.
Ct. 2683.54
According to the court’s reading of Eli Lilly & Co. v.
Medtronic, Inc.,55 only patents (other than those covering generic
drugs) whose terms could be extended under section 156 were
subject to the safe harbor.56
A patent holder whose patent is ineligible for the five-year
[patent term] extension [under § 156] is not precluded from
suing for infringement damages (except in unusual
circumstances not present here, such as those involving
patents pertaining to “follow-on” drug products rather than
pioneers.).57
Under this reasoning, research tool patents would not be
subject to the safe harbor exemption.58 The Infigen court also held
that the research was not exempt under the common law research
exception.59 The Infigen court, however, misperceived the holding
in Eli Lilly, which did not limit the patents covered by section
271(e)(1) to those eligible for term extensions under section 156.60
To the contrary, the Court recognized that in “some relatively rare
54

Id. at 980. At least one commentator agrees with this limitation of the safe harbor
provision. See Flaherty, PMA Primary, supra note 42, at 345–46.
55
496 U.S. 661, 672 (1990).
56
See Infigen, 65 F. Supp. 2d 967, 980 (W.D. Wis. 1999).
57
Id. (emphasis added).
58
See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 29–30
n.12, Merck KGAA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005) (No. 03–1237)
[hereinafter Brief for the United States]. The United States stated that this symmetry
between sections 156 and 271(e)(1) was “another indication that Congress did not intend
to include research tools within the scope of the inventions to which section 271(e)(1)
applies.” Id.
59
See Infigen, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 981. The Federal Circuit has held that the common
law research exemption is essentially non–existent. See also Madey v. Duke University,
307 F.3d 1351, 1361–63 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
60
See Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 661.
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situations,” patents will not be eligible for an extension, but still be
subject to the exemption of section 271(e)(1).61 Although the
Court could not “readily imagine such situations,”62 countless
possibilities do exist.
D. The Safe Harbor Is Construed Broadly
With minor exceptions, the courts have adopted an expansive
reading of the safe harbor exemption. Representative of this
liberal interpretation is Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel,
Inc.63 There, Amgen sued Hoechst for infringement of Amgen’s
patents on erythropoietin (EPO) and also sought a declaratory
judgment that its patents would be infringed if Hoechst received
FDA approval.64 The Amgen court reviewed six potentially
infringing activities: (1) exports of EPO; (2) purity testing; (3)
manufacture of consistency batches; (4) characterization of the
product; (5) viral clearance tests in Europe; and (6) radio labeling,
and found that each was protected by the safe harbor.65
As to the first category, Hoechst exported EPO to its Japanese
affiliate for use as a reference in evaluating and improving its own
manufacturing process.66 Amgen contended that the shipment was
not reasonably related to FDA approval because Hoechst had not
sought approval of that particular process.67 The court disagreed.68
Since an alternative process would require FDA approval, and
FDA guidelines supported the use of a reference standard from one
process to evaluate an alternative process, the conduct was exempt,
even though the data would not be included in Hoechst’s FDA
submission.69

61

Id. at 671–72.
Id. at 672 n.4.
63
3 F. Supp. 2d 104 (D. Mass. 1998). In reaching its decision, the Amgen court
specifically criticized the decision in Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech,
Inc., 666 F. Supp. 1379 (N.D. Cal. 1987). Amgen 3 F. Supp. 2d at 107–08.
64
Id. at 106.
65
Id. at 108–11.
66
Id. at 109.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id.
62

COGGIO

2005]

2/1/2006 5:59 PM

SCOPE OF THE “SAFE HARBOR” PROVISION

11

In an attempt to analyze its product for purity, Hoechst
conducted tests to identify pyrogens.70 Amgen asserted that the
tests were infringing since not all the resulting data would be
submitted to the FDA; rather, some were actually submitted to
European regulatory authorities.71 Hoechst claimed the tests were
performed to confirm the purity of its EPO for use in clinical
trials.72 The court held that even if the data obtained from the tests
were insufficient for FDA purposes, the tests were nevertheless
reasonably related to FDA clinical trials and thus exempt.73
Hoechst’s preparation of commercial-scale batches of EPO was
also accused of infringement, primarily because the batches were
abandoned due to lack of potency.74 Amgen asserted that this
abandonment indicated that the manufacture of these batches was
not reasonably related to the FDA-approval process.75 The court,
however, held that the conduct was protected because the batches
would likely lead to the generation of useful information regarding
the pharmaceutical product.76
The court held that the remaining activities were protected,
even though some were not necessary to secure FDA approval.77
For example, Amgen contended that Hoechst’s worldwide efforts
to gain approval for its version of EPO were not exempt.78 The
court disagreed and held that under Amgen’s position, the
disclosure of information obtained during clinical trials to anyone
other than FDA would void the exemption.79 Instead, the court
concluded that all of Hoechst’s activities challenged by Amgen
were reasonably related to obtaining FDA approval. Thus, the
infringement action was dismissed.80
70

Id..
Id.
72
Id. at 110.
73
Id.
74
Id..
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Id. at 110–11.
80
The court’s ruling also eliminated Amgen’s right to declaratory relief because it
could not establish a controversy satisfying the constitutional requirements. Although
Hoechst would undoubtedly market EPO upon FDA approval and a “controversy” was
71
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The broad scope of the exemption is also exemplified by
Wesley Jessen Corp. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc.,81 where the court
held that the safe harbor applied to post-approval clinical studies
required by the FDA.82 There, the FDA granted Bausch & Lomb
tentative approval of its extended-wear contact lens, provided it
conducted a post-approval study investigating any adverse
effects.83 The court noted that “[n]owhere in [the] language [of the
statute] . . . does Congress show an intent to limit the section
271(e)(1) exception solely to pre-approval activities.”84 Since the
FDA had required the studies, they certainly were “reasonably
related to the development and submission of information” to that
agency and were therefore exempt.85
Another decision illustrating the liberal interpretation of
section 271(e)(1) is Nexell Therapeutics, Inc. v. Amcell Corp.,86
where the use of the patented invention in clinical trials was
exempt,87 even though the FDA had expressed concerns that the
trials were not adequate for FDA submission. According to the
patentee, under these circumstances, the trials could not be
“reasonably related” to seeking FDA approval.88 This argument
was dismissed:
[U]nless the court is confronted with the extreme case in
which either it is clear that certain otherwise infringing
activities are outside the FDA approval process or the FDA
present, the court held that numerous factors militated against exercising jurisdiction at
that time. First, not only was FDA approval an uncertain event, but the product or the
process used by Hoechst might undergo changes that could be material to an
infringement analysis, thus rendering any judgment moot. Second, because Hoechst
would infringe only when its conduct exceeded the safe harbor, the court declined to
upset the balance envisioned by Congress by allowing the declaratory judgment action to
proceed before marketing began. Id. at 112–13.
81
235 F. Supp. 2d 370 (D. Del. 2002).
82
Id. at 376.
83
Id.
84
Id. at 376.
85
Id.; see also Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen Idec, 381 F. Supp. 2d 452,
455–56 (D. Md. 2005) (rejecting the argument that safe harbor “applies only to drugs
which have not yet been approved by the FDA, [but it can cover] post approval activities
associated with a drug that is already on the market”).
86
199 F. Supp. 2d 197 (D. Del. 2002).
87
Id. at 202–05.
88
Id. at 200.
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itself affirmatively indicates that a party’s activities are not
reasonably related to obtaining its approval, the court will
not find that accused activities that a defendant objectively
believes could generate information that is likely to be
relevant to the FDA approval process are not “reasonably
related” to obtaining FDA approval.89
Put simply, the court would not limit the scope of the safe
harbor unless an “extreme case” was shown.90
The broadest interpretation of section 271(e)(1) is articulated in
Bristol–Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone–Poulenc Rorer, Inc.,91 where
the court ruled that Bristol-Myers’ drug discovery efforts using
Rhone–Poulenc Rorer’s (“RPR”) patented intermediates to
investigate and/or identify potential new drug candidates were
exempt.92 The Bristol-Myers court held that all pharmaceutical
research, including basic research, the synthesis of new drug
candidates, their initial testing, and the determination of which
drug candidates to pursue, was protected by the safe harbor.93
Indeed, the court held that “[i]t would be nonsensical for the
exemption to apply only in the development process after a drug
candidate was identified” because infringement would necessarily
occur before the protection of the safe harbor was reached.94 As
discussed infra, this “gap” in protection is noted in Judge
Newman’s dissenting opinion in Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. V.
Merck KGAA.95

89

Id. at 203. See also Ino Therapeutics, Inc. v. Sensormedics Corp., C.A. No. 00–6033
(AET) (D.N.J. Nov. 27, 2003) Mem. Op. at 4–5 (holding sales of nitrous oxide to holders
of investigational new drug applications was protected by the safe harbor).
90
Nexell Therapeutics 199 F. Supp. 2d at 203.
91
No. 95 C 8833, 2001 WL 1512597 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2001). RPR’s patent claimed
semi–synthetic processes for synthesizing the drug taxol and four intermediates used in
preparing that drug.
92
Id. at *6.
93
Id.
94
Id. It is ironic that in many cases, a party (other than a generic) must infringe before
it is eligible for protection under the safe harbor. See generally Janice M. Mueller, No
“Dilettante Affair”: Rethinking the Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement
for Biomedical Research Tools, 76 WASH. L. REV. 1, 22–25 (2001).
95
See Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. V. Merck KGAA, 331 F.3d 860, 872–78 (Fed. Cir.
2003).
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Under Bristol-Myers, it appeared that all pharmaceutical
research conducted to identify new drugs was exempt.96 In
addition, since the term “patented invention” is not limited to
patents extendable by section 156, a defendant could contend that
the use of patented pipettes during drug discovery is protected by
the safe harbor.97 In view of Merck v. Integra Lifesciences,
however, Bristol-Myers is not the law.
III. MERCK V. INTEGRA LIFESCIENCES
A. The Federal Circuit Decision
Section 271(e)(1), research tool patents, and related damages
took center stage in Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGAA.98
There, Integra alleged that Merck had directly infringed and
induced Scripps to infringe five patents by encouraging Scripps’
tests on a target drug and related compounds.99 Significantly, the
research was conducted after Scripps had discovered that the target
compound was potentially useful in treating cancer.100 The
defendants argued that their conduct was exempt under section
271(e)(1).101 The jury disagreed and returned a verdict for Integra,
awarding $15 million in damages.102 In a 2-1 decision, the Federal
96

See Bristol–Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone–Poulenc Rorer, Inc., No. 95 C 8833, 2001
WL 1512597, at *6. This, of course, does not include the filing of an ANDA or a paper
NDA with a paragraph IV certification, either of which is an act of infringement under 35
U.S.C. § 271(e)(2).
97
In passing, the Bristol-Myers court quoted one portion to the legislative history of the
Act (later emphasized in Integra Lifesciences), which notes that the safe harbor “does not
result in the total extinguishment of the patent owner rights, because the patent owner
still maintains a right to exclude others from the commercial marketplace.” Id. at *6 n.6
(citation omitted). Quite possibly, the court may have believed that the RPR patents
would be infringed and a lawsuit would be instituted when Bristol-Myers commercialized
the resulting product. But the final product could well be made without using (i.e.,
infringing) the patented intermediates. Thus, an action for infringement of the RPR
patents might never be filed, and the patents might well have become commercially
worthless. This same situation can apply to research tool patents.
98
331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
99
Id. at 862–64.
100
Id. at 863.
101
Id.
102
Id. at 869.
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Circuit, per Judge Rader, affirmed the verdict, but vacated the
award of damages and remanded the case for further
consideration.103 In its decision, the court limited the scope of
section 271(e)(1) and suggested that the use of research tools,
which were not even at issue in the case, in basic drug discovery
was not exempt from patent infringement.104 Judge Newman
dissented.105
The Federal Circuit opined that the Hatch–Waxman Act had
two key purposes: (1) to extend the term of pharmaceutical patents
to compensate for delays in the FDA approval process (section
156); and (2) to overrule Roche v. Bolar to ensure that the
marketing of pharmaceuticals, particularly generic drugs, would
not be unnecessarily delayed.106 As support, the court referenced
to the legislative history, which authorizes “‘a limited amount of
testing so that generic manufactures can establish the
bioequivalency of a generic substitute’.”107 Despite its emphasis
on generic drugs, the court noted that clinical trials were exempt
under section 271(e)(1).108
The court concluded that the Scripps’ research did not develop
information for submission to the FDA, but was conducted to
identify the best potential candidate for human testing.109 The
Supreme Court, however, indicated that this very conduct was
exempt.110 The crux of the Federal Circuit’s decision reads:
The focus of the entire exemption is the provision of
information to the FDA. Activities that do not directly
produce information for the FDA are already straining the
relationship to the central purpose of the safe harbor. The
term “reasonably” permits some activities that are not
103

Id. at 872.
Id. at 871.
105
Id. at 872.
106
Id. at 865.
107
Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 98–857, at 8 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2692). The court also noted that the legislative history indicated that the “nature of the
interference” with the rights of the patentee could not be “substantial,” but only “de
minimis.”
108
Id.
109
Id.
110
See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 665–78 (1990).
104
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themselves the experiments that produce FDA information
to qualify as “solely for uses reasonably related” to clinical
tests for the FDA. Again, however, the statutory language
limits the reach of that relationship test.
In this case, the Scripps work sponsored by Merck was not
clinical testing to supply information to the FDA, but only
general biomedical research to identify new pharmaceutical
compounds. The FDA has no interest in the hunt for drugs
that may or may not later undergo clinical testing for FDA
approval.
For instance, the FDA does not require
information about drugs other than the compound featured
in an Investigational New Drug application. Thus, the
Scripps work sponsored by Merck was not “solely for uses
reasonably related” to clinical testing for FDA.111
The court again stressed that the purpose of the Act was to
“expedite FDA approval of a generic version of a drug already on
the market. . . . Therefore, the § 271(e)(1) safe harbor covers those
pre-expiration activities ‘reasonably related’ to acquiring FDA
approval of a drug already on the market.”112 Relying on the
Intermedics test, the court stated that the safe harbor exempts
research that “‘would contribute (relatively directly)’ to
information the FDA considers in approving a drug.”113 But the
safe harbor does not exempt drug discovery efforts simply because
the resulting product requires FDA approval.114 Indeed, “[t]he safe
harbor does not reach any exploratory research that may rationally
form a predicate for future FDA clinical tests.”115 Significantly,
the Supreme Court endorsed this conclusion.116
Turning to research tool patents (which were not implicated by
the facts as presented), the Federal Circuit noted that extending
111

Integra Lifesciences, 331 F.3d at 866 (emphasis added). But see H.R. Rep. No. 98–
857 (Pt. 1) at 45 (1984) (“A party which develops such information, but decides not to
submit an application for approval, is protected as long as the development was done to
determine whether or not an application for approval would be sought.”).
112
Integra Lifesciences 331 F.3d at 867.
113
Id.
114
Id.
115
Id. (emphasis added).
116
Merck KGAA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2372, 2383 (2005).
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section 271(e)(1) to cover Scripps’ research “would effectively
vitiate the exclusive rights of patentees owning biotechnology tool
patents” and would certainly not be a “de minimis encroachment
on the rights of the patentee.”117 Thus, Bristol–Myers, which is not
even mentioned in the court’s opinion, is clearly not the law.118
In her dissent, Judge Newman opined that the common law
research exemption should exempt early pharmaceutical research,
and section 271(e)(1) should protect further developmental efforts
until commercialization.119 Otherwise, infringing research is
necessary, and this would create a “gap” before the safe harbor
exemption was reached.120 Her concerns were not limited to
pharmaceutical research; she was disturbed that technological
progress121 would be hampered if all research, particularly basic
research, were potentially infringing.122

117

Integra Lifesciences, 331 F.3d at 867.
The court vacated the damages award because it was not clear that the lower court
properly analyzed the hypothetical negotiation before the infringement began. Indeed,
the value of a license could be “dramatically different” at a later date. In determining the
amount, the court noted that the level of risk associated with the technology should be
assessed, as well as a party’s inability to predict success, and the number of patent
licenses necessary to conduct the research (“patent stacking”). Id. at 870–71. In
particular, the Federal Circuit stated that the royalty would be lower if negotiated at the
beginning of the research, rather than closer to product launch. On remand, Integra was
awarded $6.375 million as damages. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGAA, 96 CV
1307–B (AJB) 2004 WL 2284001, *1 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2004). Unfortunately, the
methodology used to determine the amount did not relate to research tool patents. See
generally Donald Ware, Research Tool Patents: Judicial Remedies, 30 AIPLA Q.J. 267
(2002); Michael J. Stimson, Damages for Infringement of Research Tool Patents: The
Reasonableness of Reach Through Royalties, 2003 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3 (2003).
119
Integra Lifesciences, 331 F.3d at 875.
120
Id. at 875–77.
121
See id. at 875–77. “[T]he patent system both contemplates and facilitates research
into patented subject matter, whether the purpose is scientific understanding or evaluation
or comparison or improvement.” Id. at 875.
122
See id. Since, in many areas of technology, technical information is not published
apart from patents, how can the technology be studied, improved or “design[ed] around,”
if such efforts constitute patent infringement? If these efforts were prohibited, why then,
according to Judge Newman, must patents comply with the written description and best
mode requirements? Certainly, when the patents expire 17–20 years later, the disclosures
would be ancient. Judge Newman posits that these requirements indicate that
contemporaneous (non–infringing) experiments are contemplated, i.e., the patented
invention is not placed “on ice” and protected from further study for years. Id.
118
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According to Judge Newman, when basic research ends and
commercial development begins, the common law research
exemption expires.123 In this case, however, the developmental
work was protected by section 271(e)(1).124 While she agreed with
the limited origins of the section, she recognized that its scope had
been extended;125 she agreed, however, that it did not reach back
down the chain of experimentation to cover basic research.126
According to her, however, those research efforts should be
exempt under the common law research exemption.127 Judge
Newman’s opinion seemingly ignores Madey v. Duke
University,128 which would indicate that Scripps’ early research
efforts were not protected by the common law research exemption,
although the district court had ruled otherwise.129
As to research tools, Judge Newman differentiated between the
use of a tool to conduct research and research on the tool itself.130
Research “on” the tool should be exempt, but the use of a tool “for
the purpose for which it was made” infringes.131 Under Judge
Newman’s view, if a research tool, e.g., an assay, is used to
identify new drug candidates—the “purpose for which it was
made”—that conduct should infringe.132
Unfortunately, the
relationship between research tool patents and the safe harbor
exemption was not addressed by the Supreme Court.133

123

Id. at 876.
Id.
125
Id. at 877.
126
Id.
127
Id. at 878.
128
307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
129
See id. at 1352.
130
Integra Lifesciences, 331 F.3d at 877–78.
131
Id. at 878 n.10 (citing Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
132
Id.
133
See Merck KGAA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct 2372, 2382 n.7 (2005)
(quoting Judge Newman’s dissent: 331 F.3d at 878, “Use of an existing tool in one’s
research is quite different from study of the tool itself”).
124
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B. The Arguments Before the Supreme Court
Before the Supreme Court, Merck stressed the dire public
policy ramifications of the Federal Circuit’s decision.134 Indeed,
unless the decision was reversed:
The patent holder would be able to bar all laboratory tests
using the compound—or, as in this case, any structurally
similar compound. . . . Drug innovators and researchers
will have to sit on their hands awaiting patent expiration
before starting to conduct the battery of experiments
necessary to qualify a potentially path-breaking new
drug . . . . Consequently, the patent holder will enjoy a de
facto patent-term extension, while potential treatment for
innumerable diseases and conditions will be denied to
patients for a decade or more after all patents expire.135
The brief summarized the preclinical testing necessary for an
IND to demonstrate that Scripps’ research was exempt.136 Since it
did not need to establish that all drug discovery efforts were
exempt to prevail, Merck stressed that the alleged infringing
conduct “reflected a shift from basic discovery to inquiry into how
this particular structure would work as a drug.”137 Thus, once
screening ends, and “a particular structure” shows promise, efforts
to optimize that drug by experiments on “related drugs” is exempt
as long as “the experiment relates to a topic that is of interest to the
FDA.”138 According to Merck, a “world of difference [exists]
between basic exploratory research or screening of untested
structures in test tubes and the drug optimization and preclinical
research [necessary in an IND].”139 The Supreme Court followed
this generalized approach in stating that “basic scientific research”
is not exempt under the safe harbor.140
134

See Brief for Petitioner at 41–43, Merck KGAA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 125 S.
Ct. 2372 (No. 03–1237) [hereinafter Brief for Petitioner].
135
Id. at 4.
136
Id. at 7.
137
Id. at 13.
138
Id. at 39.
139
Id. at 40.
140
See Merck KGAA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2372, 2382 (2005).
Although research tool patents were “not at issue,” the danger to such patents, according
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Integra contended that only preclinical studies directed to
safety—not efficacy—conducted in accordance with the FDA’s
“Good Laboratory Practices” were exempt.141 Since Scripps’ tests
did not satisfy this requirement, they were irrelevant to the FDA
approval process.142 In support of its position, Integra cited FDA
regulations requiring that preclinical tests on safety be included in
an IND application, but such regulations did not require any tests
on the drug’s efficacy.143 Similarly, tests on related compounds
are relevant to safety, not efficacy, and thus are not within the
exemption unless performed under GLP, and Scripps’ tests were
not.144 In particular, efforts to identify “the best drug candidate to
subject to future clinical testing” do not generate information for
the FDA because the tests are not on the final product.145
Accordingly, Scripps’ research was not exempt.146
In its reply, Merck argued that the exemption could apply even
before Scripps settled upon the optimum structure.147 Rather,
“[s]ince the tweaking to optimize structure is an essential part of
the preclinical process,” such research must be protected.148
Setting the stage for the Supreme Court’s decision, Merck
noted that application of the exemption entails two inquires—one
temporal and one substantive.149 First, how far along the drug
development process must research be before the exemption
applies?150 Second, what categories of information (i.e., types of
research) are relevant to the FDA’s regulatory role?151 As shown
to Merck, would be “limited,” and therefore, this consideration had “little bearing” on
Congressional intent regarding the safe harbor. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 134, at
33, 41, 43.
141
Respondents’ Brief on the Merits at 4, Merck KGAA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd.,
125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005) (No. 03–1237).
142
Id. at 24.
143
Id. at 5–8.
144
Id. at 9, 37–38.
145
Id. at 27.
146
Id. at 27–28.
147
Reply Brief for Petitioner at 1, Merck KGAA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 125 S.
Ct. 2372 (No. 03–1237) [hereinafter Reply Brief for Petitioner].
148
Id.
149
Id. at 5.
150
Id.
151
Id. at 5–6.
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below, the Supreme Court addressed both questions. It could be
argued, however, that the answer to the second inquiry is much
clearer than that to the first.
C. The Supreme Court Decision
Justice Scalia, who had authored the Court’s decision in Eli
Lilly v. Medtronic, delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.152
The Court vacated the Federal Circuit’s decision and remanded the
case so that the evidence could be reviewed under the standard set
forth in the jury instructions, which the Court expressly
endorsed.153 After summarizing the general legal principles, the
Court detailed the alleged infringing research.154 These facts—as
specifically articulated by the Court—are a useful backdrop in
interpreting the scope of the safe harbor in light of the Court’s
legal pronouncements.
In 1988, Merck funded Scripps’ research on angiogenesis, a
process by which new blood vessels emanate from existing
vessels.155 In 1994, Scripps succeeded in reversing tumor growth
using, inter alia, a cyclic RGD peptide provided by Merck under a
research agreement.156 In 1995, based upon this early success,
Merck entered a new agreement to fund further research by
Scripps, including in vitro and in vivo testing of RGD peptides, to
identify a “primary candidate” for clinical testing.157 Scripps
conducted additional experiments on RGD peptides supplied by
Merck (EMD 66203 and two closely related derivatives) to
evaluate their suitability “as potential drug candidates.”158 The
tests measured “the efficacy, specificity, and toxicity of the
particular peptides . . . and evaluated their mechanism of action

152

Merck KGAA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005).
Id. at 2384.
154
Id. at 2377–79.
155
Id. at 2377–78.
156
Id. at 2378. One of the patented peptides was used as a control in certain
experiments, but this conduct was not specifically address by the Federal Circuit or the
Supreme Court.
157
Id.
158
Id.
153
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and pharmacokinetics in animals.”159 Based upon these tests,
Scripps decided that EMD 121974 was “the most promising”
candidate to evaluate in humans.160 On July 18, 1996, as the
Merck/Scripps collaboration was continuing, Integra filed suit for
patent infringement.161 The issue at trial focused on whether the
post-1995 research fell within the safe harbor exemption.162
The Court initially stated that “the statutory text [of §
271(e)(1)] makes clear that it provides a wide berth for the use of
patented drugs in activities related to the federal regulatory
process.”163 Furthermore, the “exemption from infringement
extends to all uses of patented inventions that are reasonably
related to the development and submission of any information
under the FDCA.”164 Lower court decisions interpreting the scope
of the safe harbor will undoubtedly be guided by its “wide berth”
of protection.165 Just how wide will be determined on a case-bycase basis. The Court’s decision, however, can be conveniently
parsed to answer discreet questions related to the scope of the
exemption. This analysis follows.
1. Generic v. Branded Products
The safe harbor is not limited to the preparation of generic
(“ANDA”) applications.166 Rather, it includes NDAs, BLAs, and
so-called paper-NDAs (§ 505(b)(2) applications).167 As the Court
stated:
[Congress] did [not] create an exemption applicable only to
the research relevant to filing an ANDA for approval of a
generic drug. Rather, it exempted from infringement all
159

Id. Somewhat later, in November 1996, Merck initiated a formal project to guide
one of the RGD peptides (EMD 85189) through regulatory approval. Merck later
switched focus to EMD 121974. Id. at 2379.
160
Id. at 2378.
161
Id. at 2379.
162
Id.
163
Id. at 2380 (emphasis added).
164
Id.
165
See, e.g., Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen Idec, 381 F. Supp. 2d 452, 456
(D. Md. 2005).
166
See, e.g., Merck KGAA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2372, 2383 (2005).
167
See id.
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uses of patented compounds “reasonably related” to the
process of developing information for submission under
any federal law regulating the manufacture, use, or
distribution of drugs.168
The Federal Circuit opinion had caused some confusion on this
point.
2. Clinical Trials v. Preclinical Tests
Addressing the issue raised by the petition for certiorari, the
Court held that the safe harbor exemption is not limited to clinical
trials, but can encompass preclinical tests.169 As the Court stated:
[The exemption] necessarily includes preclinical studies of
patented compounds that are appropriate for submission to
the FDA in the regulatory process. There is simply no
room in the statute for excluding certain information from
the exemption on the basis of the phase of research in
which it is developed or the particular submission [INDA v.
NDA] in which it could be included.170
....
[T]he FDA requires that applicants include in an IND
summaries of the pharmacological, toxicological,
pharmacokinetic, and biological qualities of the drug in
animals. . . . The primary (and, in some cases, only) way in
which a drug maker may obtain such information is
through preclinical in vitro and in vivo studies.171
Unfortunately, the Court did not explain what studies are
“appropriate for submission.”172 Ironically, the Court also held
that an FDA submission is not necessary for the exemption to
apply.173 Regardless, the holding demonstrates (clearly shows)

168
169
170
171
172
173

Id.
Id. at 2380.
Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
Id. at 2381 (emphasis added).
Id. at 2380.
Id. at 2382.
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that the types of research potentially included within safe harbor
protection are quite broad.174
3. Safety v. Efficacy Tests
In rejecting Integra’s argument that only preclinical safety tests
are exempt from Section 271(e)(1)’s safe harbor protection, the
Court held that preclinical tests evaluating either a drug’s safety or
efficacy are potentially subject to the safe harbor.175
[T]he FDA does not evaluate the safety of proposed clinical
experiments in a vacuum; rather, as the statute and
regulations reflect, it asks whether the proposed clinical
trial poses an “unreasonable risk.” . . . Accordingly, the
FDA directs that an IND must provide sufficient
information for the investigation to “make his/her own
unbiased risk-benefit assessment of the appropriateness of
the proposed trial.” . . . Such information necessarily
includes preclinical studies of a drug’s efficacy in
achieving particular results.176
In addition, preclinical tests (e.g., safety, efficacy, mode of
action, etc.) need not be performed under good laboratory practice
requirements to come within safe harbor.177 Integra’s argument
that preclinical studies (other than safety) must comply with these
standards was rejected.178
[T]he FDA’s requirement that preclinical studies be
conducted under “good laboratory practices” applies only
to experiments on drugs “to determine their safety.” . . .
The good laboratory practice regulations do not apply to
preclinical studies of a drug’s efficacy, mechanism of
action, pharmacology, or pharmacokinetics. Second, FDA
regulations do not provide that even safety-related
experiments not conducted in compliance with good
laboratory practices regulations are not suitable for
174
175
176
177
178

Id.
Id. at 2381.
Id. (quoting 21 C.F.R. § 312.22(a) (2005)).
Id. at 2381–82.
Id.

COGGIO

2005]

2/1/2006 5:59 PM

SCOPE OF THE “SAFE HARBOR” PROVISION

25

submission in an IND. Rather, such studies must include
“a brief statement of the reason for the noncompliance.”179
Thus, all preclinical trials are potentially exempt under the
safe harbor regardless of their compliance with good
laboratory practice.
4. Submission Of Data To The FDA
The use of patented compounds in experiments which generate
data that are not submitted to the FDA may still come within the
safe harbor.180
[T]he use of a patented compound in experiments that are
not themselves included in a “submission of information”
to the FDA does not, standing alone, render the use
infringing. The relationship of the use of a patented
compound in a particular experiment to the “development
and submission of information” to the FDA does not
become more attenuated (or less reasonable) simply
because the data from that experiment are left out of the
submission that is ultimately passed along to the FDA.181
Indeed, it would seem beyond dispute that test results need not
be submitted for the exemption to apply, especially since the
Court’s opinion focuses on this particular issue.
This case presents the question whether uses of patented
inventions in preclinical research, the results of which are
not ultimately included in a submission to the [FDA], are
exempted from infringement by 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1).182
Obviously, the Court did not require an FDA “submission” for
the exemption to apply.183

179
180
181
182
183

Id. (quoting 21 C.F.R. § 58.3(d)).
Id. at 2383.
Id.
Id. at 2376.
Id. at 2383.
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5. Tests on Non-Submitted Compounds
The Court held that the safe harbor is not limited to tests on the
specific compound that is the subject of an FDA submission.184
Thus, “drug optimization” or “tweaking” (to use Merck’s terms)
can be exempt and therefore a final drug candidate need not be
identified before the exemption can apply.185 This aspect of the
Court’s ruling is particularly significant to pharmaceutical
companies. It does not follow . . . that § 271(e)(1)’s exemption
from infringement categorically excludes . . . experimentation on
drugs that are not ultimately the subject of an FDA submission.186
[E]ven at late stages in the development of a new drug,
scientific testing is a process of trial and error. In the vast
majority of cases, neither the drug maker nor its scientists
have any way of knowing whether an initially promising
candidate will prove successful over a battery of
experiments.
That is the reason they conduct the
experiments. Thus, to construe § 271(e)(1), as the Court of
Appeals did, not to protect research conducted on patented
compounds for which an IND is not ultimately filed is
effectively to limit assurance of exemption to the activities
necessary to seek approval of a generic drug[.]187
....
Properly construed, § 271(e)(1) leaves adequate space for
experimentation and failure on the road to regulatory
approval: At least where a drug maker has a reasonable
basis for believing that a patented compound may work,
through a particular biological process, to produce a
particular physiological effect, and uses the compound in
research that, if successful, would be appropriate to include
in a submission to the FDA, that use is “reasonably related”

184
185
186
187

Id. at 2382.
Reply Brief for Petitioner, supra note 147, at 1.
Id. at 2382 (emphasis added).
Id. at 2382–83 (emphasis added).
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to the “development and submission of information
under . . . Federal Law.”188
It is clear that the safe harbor is not limited to experiments on a
single drug candidate.189
Indeed, from 1995–98, Scripps
conducted in vitro and in vivo research on multiple RGD
peptides190 supplied by Merck. These experiments focused on
EMD 66203 and two closely related derivatives and were designed
to evaluate the “suitability of each of the peptides as potential drug
candidates.”191 “The tests measured the efficacy, specificity, and
toxicity” of the candidates as well as “their mechanism of action
and pharmacokinetics” with the purpose of selecting the “most
promising candidate “for clinical trials192. These “optimization”
studies were not exempt under the Federal Circuit’s ruling.193
The scope of the safe harbor, however, does have limits. For
example, the Supreme Court did not “quibble” with the Federal
Circuit’s holding that “the exemption ‘does not globally embrace
all experimental activity that at some point, however attenuated,
may lead to an FDA approval process’.”194 If one assumes that
“basic scientific research” as defined by the Court is not exempt
(discussed infra), the key issue is how much “trial and error,”
albeit on “potential drug candidates,” is exempt from
infringement? It would seem that research specifically directed to
a limited class of drug candidates, e.g., those sharing a common
structure, or those operating via the same pathway, to determine
the “best candidate” might well be exempt. The more limited the
“class,” the more likely the research will be exempt.
6. Basic Scientific Research
“Basic scientific research,” as that term is defined by the
Supreme Court, is “surely not ‘reasonably related to the
188

Id. at 2383 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000) (emphasis added)).
See id. at 2383.
190
Id. at 2378.
191
Id.
192
Id.
193
Id. at 2382.
194
Id. (quoting Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGAA, 331 F.3d 860, 867 (Fed.
Cir. 2003)) (citation omitted).
189
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development and submission of information’ to the FDA” and thus
is not within the safe harbor.195
The Federal Circuit concluded that the exemption “does not
globally embrace all experimental activity that at some
point, however attenuated, may lead to an FDA approval
process.”196
We do not quibble with [this] statement. Basic scientific
research on a particular compound, performed without the
intent to develop a particular drug or a reasonable belief
that the compound will cause the sort of physiological
effect the researcher intends to induce, is surely not
“reasonably related to the development and submission of
information” to the FDA.197
A few key questions remain: What constitutes “basic scientific
research”? In particular, what is considered research “on a
particular compound”? What constitutes a “reasonable belief”?
Moreover, during so-called basic research, scientists usually
“inten[d] to develop a particular drug.”198 Otherwise, he or she
would not engage in the research-at-issue. But does this “intent”
exempt all drug discovery efforts? The specific facts in Merck
should be considered in answering these questions. There, the
alleged infringing research had progressed significantly by 1995—
the point in time when the parties disputed whether the safe harbor
became applicable.199 At that time, the number of potential drug
candidates was limited, and the preclinical research focused on
selecting the “most promising candidate” for testing in humans.200
This conduct is certainly not what many would consider “basic
scientific research.”
Since the Supreme Court relied heavily on the views expressed
in the U.S. government’s amicus curiae brief, it is noteworthy that
the government took the position that once a “researcher begins
195
196
197
198
199
200

Id. (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1)) (2000)).
Id. (quoting Integra Lifesciences, 331 F.3d at 867).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
See id. at 2379.
See id. at 2378.
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attempting to develop a substance with specific characteristics in
order to achieve a specific objective, the research is protected.”201
In support of its position, the government quoted an FDA guideline
that “[m]any drugs . . . are introduced into development based on
knowledge of in vitro receptor binding properties . . . .”202 As to
screening, the government proposed the following:
“[S]creening” of compounds for use in a particular drug,
including testing designed to compare the effects of
different compounds is reasonably related to the
development and submission of information to the FDA
because it allows the researcher to identify the appropriate
compound or compounds to submit. The court of appeals’
contrary view would eviscerate the exemption with respect
to non-generic drugs, because a researcher would always
have to conduct infringing tests before its work would
qualify for the exemption.
....
. . . As long as a scientist is working on developing a
particular drug . . . the number of compounds screened has
nothing to do with whether the screening was reasonably
related to the development and submission of information
to the FDA. Instead, it reflects the luck (or intuition) of the
scientist, or the difficulty of the task.203
It would appear that the Supreme Court, at least implicitly,
rejected the government’s broad interpretation of the safe harbor,
as is reflected in the Court’s exclusion of “basic scientific
research” from the exemption.204
201

Brief for the United States, supra note 58, at 17.
Id. at 12 (quoting FDA, Guidance for Industry Exposure–Response Relationships—
Study Design Data Analysis, and Regulatory Applications 3 (Apr. 2003), available at
http://www.fda.gov/cber/gdlns /exposure.htm).
203
Id. at 18–19.
204
See Merck KGAA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2372, 2382 (2005). The
American Intellectual Property Law Association [hereinafter AIPLA] argued that “early
drug discovery activity” conducted “merely to identify promising candidates for further
study” is not within the safe harbor. Brief for AIPLA as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Neither Party at 2, Merck KGAA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005)
(No. 03–1237) [hereinafter Brief for AIPLA].
202
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7. Research Tool Patents
No definitive answer on the status of such patents vis-à-vis the
safe harbor was provided. In a footnote, the Court stated:
We therefore need not—and do not—express a view about
whether, or to what extent, § 271(e)(1) exempts from
infringement the use of “research tools” in the development
of information for the regulatory process.205
In that same footnote, the Court cited Judge Newman’s
dissenting opinion that the “[u]se of an existing tool in one’s
research is quite different from the study of the tool itself.”206
Thus, in view of the footnote, the fact that the Integra patents were
viewed by Court as product patents, and that the alleged
infringement was the use of the patented peptides as products
rather than as tools, any conclusions regarding research tool
patents are dicta. Regardless, the Federal Circuit has recognized
that it is “obliged to follow . . . clearly articulated Supreme Court
dicta.”207 Of course, whether dicta is “clearly articulated” is yet
another question.
Whether accused conduct is exempt should not depend on
whether a “research tool” is used to conduct the alleged infringing
research. Rather, the determination should be based on whether
the conduct itself is within the safe harbor. If the conduct is not
exempt, the exemption will not apply. If the conduct is exempt,
205

Merck KgAA, 125 S. Ct. at 2382 n.7.
Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGAA, 331 F.3d 860, 878 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
Section 271(e)(1) uses the term “patented invention” and makes no distinction between
the types of patents covered by the exemption. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (e)(1) (2003). The
legislative history of § 271(e)(1), however, supports an argument differentiating between
research tool patents and other types of patents. See supra discussion in notes 99 and
109. The AIPLA asserted that “[h]igh–throughput screening techniques” are not exempt
because “[t]heir principal goal is the identification of candidates. . . [for] further
testing . . . .” Brief for AIPLA, supra note 204, at 20. Similarly, the Biotechnology
Industry Organization [hereinafter BIO] maintained that its “members generally, though
not uniformly, agree that screening large numbers of compounds not known or
reasonably expected to have a particular effect . . . is rarely if ever within the ambit of the
Section 271(e)(1) safe harbor.” Brief for BIO as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither
Party at 14, Merck KGAA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005) (No. 03–
1237).
207
Independent Ink, Inc. v. Ill. Tool Works, Inc., 396 F.3d 1342, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
206
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however, the mere fact that a research tool patent is involved
should not automatically preclude application of the safe harbor.
For example, if a tool is used merely to confirm the results of a
clinical trial, an argument exists that the activity is exempt. Of
course, hypotheticals yielding unforeseen results, such as using
patented pipettes during clinical trials can be envisioned. Does
such conduct infringe? Would it matter whether the patented
pipettes were absolutely necessary to confirm the results of the
clinical trials? Regardless, since the types of conduct covered by
the safe harbor exemption were broadened by the Court, the rights
of research tool patentees were diminished correspondingly. 208
IV. A PROPOSED “TEST” FOR APPLYING THE SAFE HARBOR
In limiting the scope of the safe harbor, the Court noted that
“[b]asic scientific research on a particular compound, performed
without the intent to develop a particular drug or a reasonable
belief that the compound will cause the sort of physiological effect
the research intends to induce is surely not” within the safe
harbor.209 However, the provision does exempt conduct:
[W]here a drugmaker has a reasonable basis for believing
that a patented compound may work, through a particular
biological process, to produce a particular physiological
effect, and uses the compound in research that, if
successful, would be appropriate to include in a submission
to the FDA . . . .210
In differentiating what is protected from what is not, the
following standard emerges: before the safe harbor applies, the
researcher must have a “reasonable belief” or “a reasonable basis
for believing” that the particular compound, or compounds, being

208

The government raised the possibility that research tool patents are not covered by
the § 271(e)(1) safe harbor, in which case the exemption provided by the safe harbor
would never apply to such patents, and all unauthorized uses of research tools would be
infringing. See Brief for the United States, supra note 58, at 28–29. This view has not
been accepted.
209
Merck KgAA, 125 S. Ct. at 2382.
210
Id. at 2383.

COGGIO

32

2/1/2006 5:59 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 16:1

tested will produce a “particular physiological effect.”211 This
formulation is consistent with the Federal Circuit’s statement,
approved by the Supreme Court, that “the exemption ‘does not
globally embrace all experimental activity that at some point,
however attenuated, may lead to an FDA approval process.’”212
The second requirement the Court imposed, that the resulting
information “be appropriate”213 for FDA submission, is seemingly
unnecessary.214 If the resulting information were required by the
FDA, or if it could be submitted, even if not actually required, a
stronger argument could be made that the safe harbor applies to the
accused conduct.
If this “test” is applied to the facts in Merck, the result is clear.
Based upon their earlier research, Scripps’ scientists had a
“reasonable belief” or “reasonable basis for believing” that the
“particular compounds” being tested would cause “the sort of
physiological effect” they were investigating.215 The alleged
infringing research was designed to evaluate “ the suitability of
each of the peptides as potential drug candidates.”216 The research,
as summarized by the Supreme Court, was not “general biomedical
research to identify new pharmaceutical compounds,” as
characterized by the Federal Circuit.217 Rather, it was performed
with “a reasonable belief that the compound[s] will cause the sort
of physiological effect the research intends to induce. . . .” 218
The jury instructions approved by the Supreme Court were
based on those used in Intermedics.219 They read:

211

See id. at 2382–83.
Id. at 2382 (quoting Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGAA, 331 F.3d 860, 878
(Fed. Cir. 2003)).
213
Id. at 2383. The first requirement, that the drug work “through a particular
biological process,” would seem to be unnecessary as well, except to the extent that such
information would assist in forming a “reasonable belief” that the candidate compound
would produce a particular physiological effect. Id.
214
See discussion supra Part IV.C.4.
215
See Merck KGAA, 125 S. Ct. at 2382–83.
216
Id. at 2378.
217
Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGAA, 331 F.3d 860, 866 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
218
Merck KGAA, 125 S. Ct. at 2382.
219
Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 1269 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
212
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To prevail on this [§ 271(e)(1)] defense, the [defendant]
must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it
would be objectively reasonable for a party in
[defendant’s] . . . situation to believe that there was a
decent prospect that the accused activities would
contribute, relatively directly, to the generation of the kinds
of information that are likely to be relevant in the process
by which the FDA would decide whether to approve the
product in question.”
....
[Defendant] does not need to show that the information
gathered from a particular activity was actually submitted
to the FDA.220
The Intermedics test involves interpreting the terms
“reasonable,” “objectively,” “decent prospect,” “relatively
directly,” and “information . . . likely to be relevant.”221 The test is
inherently ambiguous, even though the resulting information need
not be submitted to the FDA. The Supreme Court’s decision
supports an alternative instruction that focuses on whether there is
a “reasonable basis for believing” that the compound(s) at issue
will produce a “particular physiological effect” and, if so, whether
the information obtained from the research would be “appropriate”
for an FDA submission. As previously noted, the “submission”
prong of the test may well be unnecessary.
The Supreme Court’s formulation is more precise than that in
Intermedics. Certainly, its application, which focuses primarily on
the “reasonable belief” of the researcher, is more direct, since the
types of protectable information (e.g., safety, efficacy,
pharmacology, toxicology, pharmacokinetics, metabolism,
mechanism of action, etc.) will usually not be determinative. This
formulation is broader than one based on the Federal Circuit’s
Integra decision, but significantly narrower than one based on
Bristol-Myers v. Rhone Poulenc Rorer.222 It clearly exempts the
220
221
222

Merck KGAA, 125 S. Ct. at 2379 (citation omitted).
Intermedics, 775 F. Supp. at 1280.
No. 95 C 8833, 2001 WL 1512597 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2001).
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research at issue in Merck v. Integra, but would not exempt “basic
scientific research” as the Supreme Court has defined this term.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s decision in Merck v. Integra Lifesciences
answers a number of questions regarding the scope of the safe
harbor provision. Where the decision does not provide a clear
answer, such as, for example, on the question of what constitutes
“basic scientific research,” the formulation the decision proposes
provides more predictability than the present Intermedics standard.
Even more certainty, however, may be forthcoming. On August
17, 2005, the Federal Circuit, having received the certified
judgment of the Supreme Court, returned the case to the original
merits panel, and set dates for the filing of new briefs “with
particular attention [to be] paid to the Supreme Court decision.”223
Significantly, the “court sua sponte allow[ed] amicus briefs.”224
The Federal Circuit may thus soon answer the questions that the
Supreme Court did not address fully; and in particular, reach a
determination as to the applicability of the safe harbor exemption
to “basic scientific research” and research tools.

223

Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGAA,, Nos. 02–1052, 02–1065, 2005 WL
1965928, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 17, 2005).
224
Id.

